

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

13 November 1985

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: NIO for East Asia  
SUBJECT: Materials for Meeting with  
Ambassador Bosworth

Attached please find a recent NODIS cable  
from Ambassador Bosworth describing his  
proposals for a new U.S. policy approach  
towards the Philippines. You may find it  
useful

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*Carl Ford*  
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Ambassador Bosworth's View of U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines

Ambassador Bosworth has written a lengthy cable (see attachment) setting forth his views on U.S. policy toward the Philippines. It has been somewhat overlooked in the wake of President Marcos' announcement of a snap election, but in many ways may be as important as the famous "Sullivan Cable" from Tehran. He concludes that the current U.S. policy approach toward the Philippines has not and will not work. He then presents his proposals for a new approach which he describes as merely reorienting our strategy. In fact, if adopted, his proposals would be a major departure from current U.S. policy.

Key Points in Bosworth's Assessment of the Situation:

- The country's problems are markedly more serious than they were two years ago. The future looks even worse.
  - Marcos withdrawal from scene an unlikely option.
  - NPA/CPP chosen route to power is political not military.
- US and Marcos' agendas simply may not be compatible.
  - Any movement towards reform rubs against vested interests who are determined to accumulate as much wealth as possible before Marcos goes or, if possible, perpetuate Marcosism without Marcos.
  - As a result of Laxalt mission, Marcos will do a few things to mollify us but not enough to achieve ultimate success. If his response does not at least slow downward spiral, we need to look at alternatives.
- We have residual advantages.
  - strong Philippine preference for electoral change.
  - reservoir of pro-American sentiment.
- We should not open Pandora's box of extra-constitutional change.
- Unless the election includes a Vice Presidential option, the present uncertainty will continue until 1992--or Marcos passes from the scene. Marcos' primary objective is reelection.

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Proposed Policy:

- We should make upcoming presidential and local election the focus and instrument of our policy.
  - Policy should be announced with drama by the President.
  - Commit to increased aid to a fairly elected new government.
  - This would improve odds for a credible election.
- No matter how we package such a new approach, Marcos will consider that we have in effect given up on him.
  - This could lead to a declaration of martial law, but Bosworth believes this is unlikely.
  - More likely, Marcos would accept the facade of fair elections and work to ensure a right appearing result.
- Then, if we persuade Congress of legitimacy of the result, we have the potential to work with Marcos.
- Need for increased (aid) resources absolutely vital if we are to influence next government--whoever it is (Marcos or other).

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